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ANALYZING CONFLICTS BETWEEN INDIAN
TREATY RIGHTS AND FEDERAL
CONSERVATION REGULATIONS: ARE STATE
REGULATION STANDARDS APPROPRIATE?
I. INTRODUCTION

In July 1998, officials of the United States Department of
Agriculture's Forest Service cited David J. Gotchnik for using a
motorized.vehicle in a "no motor" area of the Boundary Waters Canoe
Area Wilderness (BWCAW) in the Superior National Forest in
Minnesota Gotchnik was traveling across Basswood Lake in northern
Minnesota in a canoe powered by an eight horsepower motor.2 In April
1998, officials cited Mark F. Steptec for crossing frozen Basswood Lake
on a motorized all-terrain vehicle.'
Using a motor vehicle in a
designated wilderness area violates 36 C.F.R. § 261(a).4 Both Gotchnik
and Steptec asserted, as an affirmative defense, their rights as members
of the Bois Forte Band of Chippewa Indians, a federally recognized

1. United States v. Gotchnik, 57 F. Supp. 2d 798,800 (D. Minn. 1999), affd, 222 F.3d 506
(8th Cir. 2000).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 36 C.F.R. § 293.6 (2000). The regulation provides that:
Except as provided in... [sections] 293.12 through 293.16, inclusive, and subject to
existing rights, there shall be in National Forest Wilderness no commercial
enterprises; no temporary or permanent roads; no aircraft landing strips; no
heliports or helispots, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment, motor-boats,
or other forms of mechanical transport.
Id. Mechanical transport is defined as including "any contrivance which travels over ground,
snow, or water on wheels, tracks, skids, or by floatation and is propelled by a nonliving power
source contained or carried on or within the device." 36 C.F.R. § 293.6(a) (2000). The
Federal Regulations include special provisions governing the Boundary Waters Canoe Area
Wilderness. See 36 C.F.R. § 293.16 (2000). Motorboat use is defined as "watercraft propelled
by a gasoline or electric powered motor with the propeller below the waterline." 36 C.F.R. §
293.16(a)(1) (2000). Within the BWCAW, there are exceptions to the motorboat restriction
that apply to particular locations and particular types of motors. On Basswood Lake, all
motorboats are prohibited on that portion "generally north of the narrows at the north end of
Jackfish Bay and north of a point on the International Boundary between Ottawa Island and
Washington Island." 36 C.F.R. § 293.16(a)(3) (2000). This is where David Gotchnik was
cited. Gotchnik, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
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Indian tribe.' The Chippewa Indians6 of Minnesota reserved rights to
hunt, fish, and gather on lands ceded to the United States in the Treaty

of 1854. 7
On May 28, 1999, the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota upheld the motor vehicle violation, denying a Gotchnik and
Steptec's Motion for Entry of Judgment of Acquittal The court held
that the limitation on motor use did not foreclose the defendants from
exercising their fishing rights in the BWCAW, but only made the
exercise of those rights less convenient.9 Alternatively, the court held
that even if the treaty right included motorized access to fishing
locations, the regulations prohibiting the use of motorized equipment in
the BWCAW are permissible, non-discriminatory conservation
measures.'0 It based its alternative holding on standards set forth in
Puyallup Tribe v. Departmentof Game (Puyallup I), a case challenging

the validity of state conservation measures when applied to Indian
treaty rights. Gotchnik and Steptec appealed the judgment. 3
On August 21, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding
that the limitation on motor use did not offend the appellants' rights

5. Gotchnik, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
6. In this Comment, the term "Indians" is used to describe a legal entity and political
entity consistent with case law.
7. See Treaty with the Chippewas, Sept. 30, 1854, U.S.-Chippewas, 10 Stat. 1109
[hereinafter Treaty of 1854]. Article 11 of the Treaty of 1854 provides: "And such of [the
Indians] as reside in the territory hereby ceded, shall have the right to hunt and fish therein,
until otherwise ordered by the President." Id.
8. Gotchnik, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
9. Id. at 802.
10. Id. at 804.
11. 391 U.S. 392 (1968). Litigation between the Puyallup Tribe and the Washington
Game Department reached the United States Supreme Court three times. In 1968, the Court
upheld non-discriminatory state conservation regulations imposed on treaty fishermen so
long as the regulations were necessary for the conservation of particular species of fish. Id. at
402-03. In 1973, the Court struck down a state ban on commercial net fishing for steelhead
because it was not a "reasonable and necessary conservation measure." Dep't of Game v.
Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 45 (1973). In 1977, the Court upheld a lower court recognition
that the treaty fishermen were guaranteed a portion of the fish harvest, rather than merely a
right to compete with nontreaty fishermen on an individual basis. Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v.
Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 177 (1977). See Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 682-84 (1979) (summarizing the "Puyallup
trilogy"). The standards addressed in this Comment are those of Puyallup L
12. Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. at 393.
13. United States v. Gotchnik, 222 F.3d 506 (8th Cir. 2000).
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under the Treaty of 1854.14 In so concluding, the court of appeals
declined to consider whether the limitation on motor use is a valid
conservation measure. 15
This Comment will examine whether federal, as opposed to state,
conservation regulations should be evaluated using the Puyallup I
analysis. It will not address whether the usufructuary 6 treaty rights of
the Chippewa include motorized access to areas within the BWCAW,
nor the district court's holding that its ruling did "nothing to diminish
the extent of the rights held by the Chippewa at the time the Treaty was
signed."' 7 This Comment will focus specifically on the district court's
alternative holding concerning conservation regulation and will assume,
for the sake of evaluating the BWCAW regulations under Puyallup I,
that motorized access is part of the Chippewa treaty right.
Part II will summarize the foundations of treaty interpretation
established in Indian law. Part III will set forth the basic principles of
the Puyallup I analysis for conservation regulations. Part IV will
examine how the analysis of federal regulations differs from the analysis
of state regulations. Part V will evaluate how the Puyallup I principles,
which were developed to evaluate challenges to state regulations, were
applied in two cases from the Eighth Circuit evaluating federal
conservation regulations, United States v. Dion8 and United States v.
Bresette.'9 Part VI will examine the Gotchnik case and what is unique
about a congressionally designated conservation resource such as
wilderness. Part VII will apply the Puyallup I standards to the Gotchnik
situation, relying on the origins of the standards for its analysis. This
Comment concludes that treaty rights may be adequately protected,
even when regulated, if courts stay grounded in the origins of the
Puyallup I standards.
II. FOUNDATIONS OF INDIAN LAW

This Comment does not analyze the treaty rights of the Chippewa
Indians. However, this section will briefly summarize the status of
treaties and canons of treaty interpretation as a foundation to
14. Id. at 511.
15. Id.

16. Black's Law Dictionary defines "usufruct" as "[a] right to use another's property for
a time without damaging or diminishing it." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1542 (7th ed. 1999).
17. United States v. Gotchnik, 57 F. Supp. 2d 798, 803 (D. Minn. 1999), affd, 222 F.3d
506 (8th Cir. 2000).
18. 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985).
19. 761 F. Supp. 658 (D. Minn. 1991).
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understanding the intermingled claims within the BWCAW.
Treaties with Indians have the same status as treaties with foreign
nationsY2
They are legally binding agreements that respect the
sovereignty of the tribal nation.2' As such, treaties take precedence over
conflicting state laws by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the United

States Constitution."
Treaty terms are interpreted in a way that Indians at the time of the
treaty would have understood them.2'

When ambiguities exist, the

United States must construe treaties in favor of the Indians to
compensate for United States negotiators' superior knowledge of the

language in which the treaty was recorded. 24
Treaties that established Indian reservations usually gave tribes
complete sovereignty within the reservation boundaries.' The United
States, in exchange for Indian lands, usually granted the reservation
lands along with other forms of compensation.'
20. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832).
21. See id. at 560.
22. See id. at 561. The United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
23. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 222 (1982).
24. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658,676 (1979).
25. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559.
26. See, e.g., Article 4 of the Treaty of 1854, which reads:
In consideration of and payment for the country hereby ceded, the United States
agree to pay to the Chippewas of Lake Superior, annually, for the term of twenty
years, the following sums, to wit: five thousand dollars in coin; eight thousand dollars
in goods, household furniture and cooking utensils; three thousand dollars in
agricultural implements and cattle, carpenter's and other tools and building
materials, and three thousand dollars for moral and educational purposes, of which
last sum, three hundred dollars per annum shall be paid to the Grand Portage band,
to enable them to maintain a school at their village. The United States will also pay
the further sum of ninety thousand dollars, as the chiefs in open council may direct,
to enable them to meet their present just engagements. Also the further sum of six
thousand dollars, in agricultural implements, household furniture, and cooking
utensils, to be distributed at the next annuity payment, among the mixed bloods of
said nation. The United States will also furnish two hundred guns, one hundred
rifles, five hundred beaver traps, three hundred dollars' worth of ammunition, and
one thousand dollars' worth of ready made clothing, to be distributed among the
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Tribes often retained rights to hunt and fish on the lands ceded to
the United States.' Under the Supremacy Clause, these property rights
still exist unless the United States Congress specifically abrogates
them.'
The Supreme Court, in evaluating legislation, is "extremely reluctant
to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights. "29The Court set forth
the current test for evaluating abrogation in United States v. Dion.3
Dion involved the taking of four bald eagles and a golden eagle by
members of the Yankton Sioux tribe in violation of the federal Eagle
Protection Act." The Court applied what has become known as Dion's
"actual consideration and choice test" for evaluating abrogation: "What
is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered the
conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty
rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty."32

Congress must compensate a tribe for the abrogation of a

treaty right if it is a recognized property right.'
III. REGULATION UNDER PUYALLUP I
In Puyallup I,'the Supreme Court defined a series of steps to
analyze whether regulating an Indian treaty right is constitutional.

Puyallup I was the first Supreme Court opinion handed down during
extensive litigation between the State of Washington Department of
Game and two Indian tribes.35 In state court, the Department of Game
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against tribal members who

claimed a treaty right of "'taking fish, at all usual and accustomed
young men of the nation, at the next annuity payment.
Treaty of 1854, supra note 7, at art. 4.
27. See supra, note 7.
28. Congress has the power
[T]o abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such power will
be exercised only when circumstances arise which will not only justify the
government in disregarding the stipulations of the treaty, but may demand, in the
interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that it should do so.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
29. Washington State, 443 U.S. at 690.
30. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).

31. See id. at 735.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 739-40.
See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968).
COHEN, supranote 23, at 460-61.
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grounds and stations.., in common with all citizens of the
Territory[.]"'6 The State of Washington regulated the taking of salmon
and steelhead trout during spawn runs between the Pacific Ocean, Puget
Sound, and the Puyallup and Nisqually Rivers.37 The Supreme Court
affirmed the state's authority to regulate the Indians' fishing rights,
within particular guidelines, stating, "the manner of fishing, the size of
the take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like may be
regulated by the State in the interest of conservation, provided the
regulation meets appropriate standards and does not discriminate
against the Indians. "'

The treaty conflict analysis consists of three steps. In the first step, a
court must determine whether a treaty right in fact exists. 9 Such rights
must be determined on a case-by-case basis based on the specific treaty
language.4° If a treaty right exists, a court moves on to the second step
and determines whether the legislation imposing regulations actually
abrogates the treaty right.41 If the right has not been abrogated, the
court completes the third step and evaluates whether the conservation
regulation is valid. 2 In this third part of the analysis, the Puyallup I
analysis asks three questions concerning the conservation regulation: (1)
whether the regulation is reasonable and necessary for conservation of
the resource;4' (2) whether its application to Indians is necessary in the
interest of conservation;-, and (3) whether the regulation discriminates
against Indians in its application. 45 This Comment focuses on these
three questions evaluating the validity of conservation regulations.
The first two steps of the treaty conflict analysis are supported by a
fairly significant body of federal case law. Most abundant are cases
interpreting the extent and scope of particular treaty rights.46 Case law
36. Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. at 395 (quoting the Treaty with the Nisquallys, Dec. 28,
1854, U.S. -, 10 Stat. 1132).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 398.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 394-95.
41. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734,738 (1986).
42. See Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. at 393.
43. See id. at 401.
44. See id. at 401 n.14.
45. See id. at 402.
46. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999)
(interpreting treaties of 1837 and 1855 between the United States and several bands of
Chippewa Indians); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658 (1979) (interpreting treaties of 1854 and 1855 between the United States and Indians
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also provides guidelines for determining whether Congress has
abrogated rights through legislation.47 By contrast, there is scant federal
case law applying the conservation regulation analysis to conflicts
between federal conservation regulations and off-reservation treaty
rights.' The three conservation regulation questions were developed in
response to a conflict between state conservation laws and offreservation treaty rights. Before examining how the standards apply to
federal conservation regulations, it is helpful to review the state-based
origins of the Puyallup I standards. The standards developed through
several landmark cases beginning in 1916.
A. Is the Regulation Reasonable and Necessary to Conserve the
Resource?
The first conservation regulation requirement of the Puyallup I
analysis is that the regulation is reasonable and necessary to conserve
the resource. 49 The words "reasonable" and "necessary" stem from the
1916 case of New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker.' Three members of
the Seneca tribe were arrested for spearing fish within ceded territory in
the State of New York in violation of state conservation laws." The
Indians argued that New York had no power to control or regulate state
lands and waters with respect to members of the Seneca tribe, who held
a reserved property right to fish and hunt on the land conveyed in the
1797 treaty of the "Big Tree."52 The Seneca argued that the ceded
territory was subject to dual sovereignty, with tribal members regulated
by the tribe and state citizens regulated by the State, but the Supreme
Court held that "[s]uch a duality of sovereignty instead of maintaining in
each the essential power of preservation would in fact deny it to both. "'
The Court noted that, although the concept of wildlife preservation was
of the Pacific Northwest); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (interpreting treaties of 1837, 1842, and 1854
between the United States and Lake Superior Chippewa).
47. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 690 (1993) (holding that the
Cheyenne River Act of September 3, 1954, enacted pursuant to the Flood Control Act of
1944, had clearly abrogated the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe's right to exclusive use and
possession of former trust lands); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 746 (1986) (holding
that the Bald Eagle Protection Act abrogated Indian treaty rights).
48. COHEN, supra note 23, at 463.
49. See Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. at 398-401.
50. 241 U.S. 556 (1916).

51. Id. at 559.
52. Id. at 562.
53. Id. at 563.
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not developed when the Seneca Nation ceded the territory, the concept
of state sovereignty "was well understood." 4 "It is not to be doubted
that the power to preserve fish and game within its borders is inherent in
the sovereignty of the State, subject of course to any valid exercise of
authority under the provisions of the Federal Constitution."55 The
Court went on to state that if the "inherent power of preservation" was
so divided, "its competent exercise" would be "impossible. "M
While the Court's focus in Kennedy was the necessity of regulating
preservation by a single sovereign entity, the Court's focus later, in
Tulee v. Washington,57 was the conservation regulations themselves.
"Tulee, a member of the Yakima [Indian tribe], was convicted.., on a
charge of catching salmon with a net, without first having obtained a
license as required by state law."'' The Supreme Court declared that
"the treaty leaves the state with power to impose on Indians, equally
with others, such restrictions of a purely regulatory nature concerning
the time and manner of fishing outside the reservation as are necessary
for the conservation of fish."59
The Puyallup I court relied heavily on Tulee when evaluating the
validity of State of Washington conservation measures in 1968.60 The
Court did not actually rule on specific individual regulations (i.e., the
use of set nets in fresh waters), but remanded the case to the trial court
with instructions that any regulations upheld must be reasonable and
necessary. 1 The Court stressed its concept of "necessary" by citing the
parties' stipulation that if the Indians continued to operate their annual
commercial fishery, their harvest would "'virtually exterminate the
salmon and steelhead fish runs of the Nisqually River' and that 'it is
necessary for proper conservation of the salmon and steelhead fish runs
of the Nisqually River... that the plaintiffs enforce state fishery
conservation laws and regulations to the fishing activities of the
defendants at their usual and accustomed grounds. "'62
Thus, the first conservation regulation question focuses more on the
54. Id.
55. Id. at 562 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 563.

57. 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
58. Id. at 682.
59. Id. at 684.
60. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392,401 n.14 (1968).
61. Id. at 401-02.
62. Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. at 402 n.15 (quoting Dep't of Game v. Kautz, 422 P.2d 771,
774 (Wash. 1967)).
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need to preserve the resource than the actual "reasonableness" of the
regulation.6
B. Is Application of the Regulation to Indians Necessary?
The second conservation regulation requirement of the Puyallup I
analysis is that application of the regulation to Indians is necessary."
This question focuses on whether the regulation must necessarily apply
to Indians, and is distinct from whether the regulation is necessary for
conservation of the resource.6
In Tulee v. Washington, the Supreme Court upheld the Washington
state regulations that were specifically aimed at fish preservation.6 In
the same opinion, it struck down a state licensing fee as it pertained to
Indians. 7 The Court stated that the licensing fees were revenue
producing as well as regulatory.6 The licensing fees as applied to
Indians were "not indispensable to the effectiveness of a state
conservation
program" because revenue could be generated by other
69
means.
The word "indispensable" tempts users to apply it to the
conservation of the resource, but the Supreme Court has taken pains to
perpetuate the distinction between being indispensable to the
effectiveness of the program and being necessary for conservation of the
resource. In Puyallup I, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the
term "indispensable" had been applied in Tulee in the context of the
ability "for a State to have the power to tax the exercise of a 'federal
right."'7 , The Court emphasized that the term "indispensable" was not
intended to apply to a limitation placed on the taking of fish.7
The Supreme Court distinguished between a federal right and the
valid regulation of that right in Antoine v. Washington.' Relying on the
precedent of Puyallup 1,the Court declared:

63. See Tulee, 315 U.S. at 684.
64. Id. at 685.
65. See id.
66. Id.

67. Id. at 685.
68. Id. at 685.
69. See id.
70. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392,402 n.14 (1968).
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. 420 U.S. 194 (1975).
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[A]lthough, [in-common treaty] rights "may... not be qualified
by the State,... the manner of fishing [and hunting], the size of
the take, the restriction of commercial fishing [and hunting], and
the like may be regulated by the State in the interest of
conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate
standards and does not discriminate against the Indians." The
"appropriate standards" requirement means that the State must
demonstrate that its regulation is a reasonable and necessary
conservation measure, and that its application to the Indians is
necessary in the interest of conservation. 74
So clarified, the qualification that a conservation regulation is
necessary in its application to the Indians is not to be confused with its
necessity for the preservation of the resource.
C. Is the Regulation Non-Discriminatory?
The third conservation regulation requirement of the Puyallup I
analysis is that the regulation is non-discriminatory, an important
consideration when treaty rights are shared with non-Indians. 5 Often
treaties preserved a right "in common with all citizens," implying that
off-reservation treaty rights could be regulated through the police power
of the State.76 However, the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment7 requires that the regulations be imposed equally with all
citizens of a territory. The Supreme Court held in Puyallup I that "any
ultimate findings on the conservation issue must also cover the issue of
equal protection implicit in the phrase 'in common with."'78
The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed the three
conservation regulation requirements set forth in the Puyallup I
analysis. In 1999, the Court stated that it "ha[s] also recognized that
Indian treaty-based usufructuary rights do not guarantee the Indians
'absolute freedom' from state regulation."'
Furthermore, the Court
stated that they "have repeatedly reaffirmed state authority to impose
reasonable and necessary non-discriminatory regulations on Indian
74. Id. at 207 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (second and third brackets in
original).
75. Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. at 403.
76. COHEN, supra note 23, at 453.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. at 403.
79. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172,204 (1999).
80. Id. (citing Oregon Dep't of Fish and Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 753
(1985)).
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hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in the interest of conservation." 8
IV. PUYALLUP I ANALYSIS APPLIED TO A FEDERAL REGULATION

Fishing, a frequently litigated property right, is generally regulated
by a state under its police power." Puyallup I reached the Supreme
Court because of a conflict between Indian fishing rights and a state
game department's regulations. The analysis has been applied to
federal regulations in only a handful of cases. Challenged federal
regulations include the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,' the Bald and
Golden Eagle Protection Act,' and the Endangered Species Act.'
Two significant differences exist between federal and state
regulation of Indians: (1) the federal government must have
constitutional authority to impose the regulations; and (2) the federal
government's fiduciary relationship with Indian tribes may limit the
imposition of certain regulations."
The first difference is that the United States must act within the
bounds of its constitutionally granted power. Federal regulations that
affect treaty rights must pass stricter constitutional muster than state
regulations because the powers of Congress are "limited and
enumerated."'' State regulations need only demonstrate that they are
rationally related to health, welfare, and safety to be upheld.
Within the U.S. Constitution, the federal government's authority
over Indian tribes can be found in the Commerce Clause, the Treaty
Clause, and the Supremacy Clause.8 The Property Clause of the
Constitution is also a source of authority when the land at issue is the
property of the United States.' In addition, various federal agencies
81. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa,526 U.S. at 205.
82. See Catherine M. Ovsak, Comment, Reaffirming the Guarantee:Indian Treaty Rights
to Hunt and Fish Off-Reservation in Minnesota, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1177, 1190 (1994)

(citing United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312,333 (W.D. Wash. 1974)).
83. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-712 (1994).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 668 (1994).
85. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
86. See Ovsak, supra note 82, at 1185.
87. See Utah Power & Light v. United States, 230 F.2d 328, 335 (8th Cir. 1915).

88. See Bradley I. Nye, Where Do the Buffalo Roam? Determining the Scope of
American Indian Off-Reservation Hunting Rights in the PacificNorthwest, 67 WASH. L. REV.
175,179 (1992).
89. See Klamath Indian Tribe v. Oregon Dep't of Fish and Wildlife, 729 F.2d 609, 611
(9th Cir. 1984). The Property Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the... Property belonging to the
United States[.]" U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. It has been suggested that the Property
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find authority in their respective enabling legislation. For example, the
Forest Service of the United States Department of Agriculture is

empowered through its Organic Act, which established the National
Forest System.90
The second significant difference between applying the Puyallup I

test to a federal regulation instead of a state regulation is the United
States' federal trust responsibility to tribal nations. Justice Marshall
characterized this relationship as similar to that of a guardian and a
ward. 9' The federal government has a duty to take legal action to
protect Indian treaty rights when they are threatened, to promote tribal

The federal
self-government, and to preserve tribal sovereignty.'
government must balance its responsibilities to Indians and to
In contrast, states have no such
protecting natural resources.
responsibility to tribes because states were not parties to the treaties

creating this relationship.
V. PUYALLUP I ANALYSIS APPLIED TO FEDERAL CONSERVATION
REGULATIONS IN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

In two illuminating cases decided prior to Gotchnik, courts in the
Eighth Circuit relied on Puyallup v. Department of Game when faced

Clause empowers the federal government to regulate the lakes within the BWCAW. See
Eugene R. Gaetke, The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978: Regulating
Nonfederal Property Under the Property Clause, 60 OR. L. REV. 157, 158 (1981). The lakes

are navigable and thus technically owned by the State of Minnesota. See Minnesota ex rel.
Alexander v. United States, 660 F.2d 1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1981). The broad Property Clause
reading adopted by the Supreme Court in Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897)
held that Congress may legitimately regulate activities on nonfederal property when those
activities frustrate Congress's policy for federal lands. Id. A broad Property Clause reading
was reaffirmed in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (quoting United States v.
San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940) ("[W]hile the furthest reaches of the power granted by
the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed
that '[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.'")
(citations omitted). Two recent Eighth Circuit cases suggest that the motorboat restrictions
within the BWCAW would be upheld under the Property Clause. In Minnesota ex reL
Alexander v. United States, the Eighth Circuit upheld federal motorboat restrictions on
navigable waters within the BWCAW, even though navigable waters are generally regulated
by the state. 660 F.2d 1240, 1253 (8th Cir. 1981). In United States v. Brown, the Eighth
Circuit upheld the conviction of a duck hunter for hunting on state waters within Voyageur's
National Park in violation of National Park Regulations, even though duck hunting was
permitted on state waters. 552 F.2d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 1977). These two cases differ from
Gotchnik because the defendants did not raise an affirmative defense of a treaty right.
90. See 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
91. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
92. See Ovsak, supra note 82, at 1185-86.
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with a conflict between a federal regulation and Indian treaty rights.' In
both cases, United States v. Dion and United States v. Bresette, the courts
determined that treaty rights existed and had not been abrogated.
However, both courts found the conservation regulations invalid under
the third step of the Puyallup I analysis. The regulations at issue were
struck down because they were not necessary for the conservation of the
resource.
A. United States v. Dion
The first case, United States v. Dion,94 was the Court of Appeals
forerunner to the Supreme Court case establishing the current test for
treaty abrogation. Dion, a member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe, was
charged with taking several eagles and selling migratory bird feathers
and carcasses in violation of federal regulations.' He asserted his treaty
right as an affirmative defense.' The district court convicted Dion of
offering for sale or selling feathers and eagle carcasses in violation of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Eagle Protection Act.' The Eighth
Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the Yankton Sioux treaty rights to hunt
existed and had not been abrogated by the legislation. In the
conservation regulation step of the Puyallup I analysis, the court
distinguished hunting that took place on the reservation from hunting
rights that existed "in common" with others on ceded territory. An
enlightening footnote clarified the extent to which "in common" treaty
rights could be regulated, stating: "[T]he government has not
established or even claimed that the eagle will become extinct if Indians
are permitted to take eagles within the scope of their treaty rights. This
a
court is not confronted with the problem of the imminent extinction of
j
species. ' 3 By adding, "Congress may still act if it chooses to do so[,] "9
the court implied that unless the species faced irreparable harm, the
protection of the eagle was better suited to action by the legislature.
The Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in United States v. Dion °1
did not address the Eighth Circuit's distinctive interpretation of the
93. United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Bresette, 761
F.Supp. 658 (D. Minn. 1991).
94. 752 F.2d at 1261.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 1263.
97. Id. at 1262.
98. Id. at 1268 n.14.

99. Id.
100. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
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Puyallup I standard. Instead, the Court declared that Congress had
abrogated the Indians' treaty rights when it enacted the Bald Eagle
Protection Act. Because the treaty right was extinguished by one of the
challenged regulations, the Court did not need to evaluate the validity of
any of the remaining challenged regulations. Still, the Eighth Circuit's
holding provides one basis for predicting federal interpretation of
Puyallup's "reasonable" and "necessary" standards.
B. United States v. Bresette
In United States v. Bresette, °' the defendants were accused of selling
handcrafted dream catchers containing migratory bird feathers in stores
in northern Wisconsin and Minnesota. The Federal District Court of
Minnesota held that the defendants, members of the Chippewa Indian
tribe, "ha[d] a treaty right to sell these bird feathers which ha[d] not
been abrogated and [was] not, under the terms of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, subject to Puyallup limitation."' °2

In reaching the

conservation regulation step of the Puyallup I analysis, the court
admitted that "[the Puyallup I holding] does not provide a great deal of
guidance for the courts to evaluate the appropriateness of the
conservation measures."' 13 Even so, because the regulations dealt with
particular wildlife species, the court relied on a population-based
rationale to evaluate the necessity of the regulation:
Puyallup does not support the conviction of defendants for
selling the bird feathers at issue. The government cannot
reasonably contend that the statute's absolute proscription of the
sale of bird feathers in this manner is a non-discriminatory
conservation measure intended to prevent the extinction of
migratory birds. The partial restrictions addressed in Puyallup
were meant to forbid the Indians from "pursu[ing] the last living
steelhead until it enters their nets." Here the migratory birds of
Northern Minnesota and Wisconsin are not faced with extinction
due to the likes of [the defendants] °4
Both the court of appeals in Dion and the district court in Bresette
invalidated the conservation regulations because the protected species
was not threatened with imminent extinction as a result of the Indian
101.
102.
103.
104.

761 F. Supp. 658 (D. Minn. 1991).
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 664.
Id. (citation omitted).
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activity.
VI. WHAT IS UNIQUE ABOUT THE GOTCHNIK CASE AND THE

BWCAW?
The Gotchnik case is unique because the conservation regulation in
question is the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act, 5 an act
that protects a specific geographical area rather than a particular
biological species.
The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness lies immediately
south of and adjoining Canada's Quetico Provincial Park, an equally
vast and wild area protected by the Canadian government. Voyageurs
National Park lies west of the BWCAW and includes an additional
218,000 acres of lakes and boreal forest. Together, the three form a rare
international lake country ecosystem.'06
For almost one hundred years, the federal government has
recognized the natural beauty and rich resources of northern
Minnesota's vast system of interconnected lakes, streams, and
President Theodore Roosevelt created the Superior
portages."
National Forest in 1909.10 Restrictions on road construction and logging
have been in place since Calvin Coolidge's administration.' °9 President
Harry S. Truman issued air space regulations over the roadless areas of
the Superior National Forest.10 Despite this history, efforts to further
preserve the area spurred tumultuous conflict when U.S. Senator
Hubert H. Humphrey first introduced wilderness legislation in 1956."'
When the Wilderness Act was enacted in 1964, political compromises
resulted in the denial of full wilderness status to specific portions of the
BWCA.112 Even so, the BWCA was subsequently embroiled in
extensive litigation between wilderness advocates and people who
depended on the area for their livelihood."' The BWCAW Act of 1978
was an attempt to resolve some of those conflicts through additional

105. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1994).
106. See Richard A. Duncan & Kevin Proescholdt, Protecting the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area Wilderness: Litigation and Legislation, 76 DENv. U. L. REv. 621, 622 (1999).
107. See id. at 623.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 624.

110. See id.
111. See id. at 625.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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compromise and clarification. 14 Special wilderness exceptions still exist
for the BWCAW, including motorboat lake quotas, horsepower
restrictions, and a number of mechanized portages."5
VII. PUYALLUP I STANDARDS APPLIED TO THE BWCAW

The first two steps of the treaty conflict analysis ask whether a treaty
right exists and whether it has been abrogated. In the BWCAW, the

usufructuary treaty rights of the Chippewa were guaranteed in the
Treaty of 1854. The Gotchnik court held that Congress did not intend to
abrogate treaty rights through the BWCAW legislation ' 16 and, therefore,
7
by specifically limiting motorized travel within the wilderness,"
18
right.
the
of
part
Congress was not recognizing motorized access as
In order to address the Gotchnik court's alternative holding and
evaluate the application of the Puyallup conservation standards to the

BWCAW motor restrictions, we must assume for the sake of analysis
that motorized access is part of the treaty right.
A. Are the BWCA W Motor Restrictions Reasonableand Necessary to

Conserve the Wilderness?
It is interesting to note that the "resource" of the BWCAW is a

"creation" of the federal government. It is a congressionally designated
area rather than a naturally occurring species with a discrete population.
Indians at the time of the Treaty of 1854 could not have imagined the
need to protect the wilderness to preserve it. However, this alone does

not invalidate a treaty interpretation. The Supreme Court addressed
this canon of treaty interpretation in 1916 when it upheld a New York
conservation law:
114. See id. at 626.
115. See id. at 626-27. The 1964 Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§1131-1136 (1994)), designated the Boundary Waters
Canoe Area (BWCA). The Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-495, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §1132 (1994)),
redesignated the wilderness the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness (BWCAW).
Duncan & Proescholdt, supra note 106, at 621 n.2.
116. Section 17 of the BWCAW Act reads: "Nothing in this Act shall affect the
provisions of any treaty now applicable to lands and waters which are included in the...
wilderness." Pub. L. No. 95-495, § 17, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978).
117. Section 4 of the BWCAW Act sets forth specific limits on motorized travel. Pub. L.
No. 95-495, § 4, 92 Stat. 1649 (1978).
118. A similar rationale was set forth in Minnesota ex rel. Alexander v. United States,
part of which addressed the affect of the BWCAW legislation on international treaties with
Canada. 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
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[I]t is idle to suppose that there was any actual anticipation at the
time the treaty was made of the conditions now existing to which
the legislation in question was addressed. Adopted when game
was plentiful-when the cultivation contemplated by the whites
was not expected to interfere with its abundance-it can hardly
be supposed that the thought of the Indians was concerned with
the necessary exercise of inherent power under modem
conditions for the preservation of wild life. n9
Therefore, the fact that the Indians did not conceive of the need for
a geographically defined resource (designated wilderness) at the time of
the treaty does not invalidate the resource as it exists today. Neither
fish nor wildlife state regulations were conceived of at the time of many
'2
Indian treaties, yet the regulations have long been upheld by courts. 1
While some may consider it a "stretch" to define a wilderness area as
a conservation resource in the context of the Puyallup I standard, others
may applaud the recognition that wildlife and humans do not live in
isolation.' Supporting this view, one commentator has even proposed
that wildlife may be protected by the public trust doctrine:
[T]he public trust doctrine offers a framework for resource
management and decision making that is ecosystemic. By
ecosystemic, I mean an approach that allows resource managers
to consider both the short-term and long-term needs of wildlife,
the health of the habitat upon which a specific species or variety
of species depend for survival, and the needs and goals of those
humans who interact with wildlife in the ecosystem. "
119. New York ex reL Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556,563 (1916); see also Washington
v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 668 (1979).
The Washington State court discussed that:
Because of the great abundance of fish and the limited population of the area, it
simply was not contemplated that either party would interfere with the other's
fishing rights. The parties accordingly did not see the need and did not intend to
regulate the taking of fish by either Indians or non-Indians, nor was future
regulation foreseen.
Washington State, 443 U.S. at 668.
120. See H. Anthony Ruckel, The Wilderness Act and the Courts, 76 DENV. U. L. REv.
611, 619 (1999).
121. See Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expandingthe Public Trust Doctrineto
Include Protectionof Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723,723-24 (1989).
122. Id. at 725.
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While wildlife conservation is a typical justification for preserving a
unique ecosystem in its natural state, wildlife was not the emphasis of
Congress when it designated the BWCAW.'" Congress was clearly
treating the ecosystem as a conservation resource in and of itself,'24 and
this strongly stated intent has made judicial evaluation fairly consistent.
In general, courts have upheld wilderness regulations.'# "It has taken
strong action by the judiciary to strike the balances and make the
determinations that have ensured that qualifying lands were all
reviewed [for wilderness designation] and then, when formally
dedicated as wilderness, protected. ,,126
B. Is Application of the BWCA W Motor Restrictions to Indians
Necessary?
Wilderness areas are intended not only to protect wildlife species but
to accomplish other goals equally important in the eyes of Congress,
such as maintaining a federal area with primeval character and
providing opportunities for solitude and primitive recreation."
Wilderness regulations do not fulfill congressional intent to preserve the
solitude and integrity of the ecosystem unless they are applied to all
individuals at all times.
Congress states that the boundary of the wilderness defines a
pristine area untouched by human civilization in which wildlife may
123. See Ruckel, supra note 120, at 612.
124. "Wilderness" as defined by Congress is:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works dominate
the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its community of
life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.
An area of wilderness is further defined to mean in this chapter an area of
underdeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without
permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so
as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been
affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work
substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a
primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of
land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an
unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other
features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value.
16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1994).
125. See Ruckel, supra note 120, at 619.
126. See id.
127. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (c) (1994).
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This serves not only to
flourish free from modem intervention."
benefit wildlife population, but the quality of its environment.
Comparing one motor violation in the wilderness is not identical to
comparing the loss of a particular number of animals or plants to a total
population of that species. One motor violation destroys the wilderness
and meets the "imminent extinction" described by the court of appeals
in Dion.'9
In addition to protecting wildlife, wilderness areas are defined by
Congress as protecting natural ecosystems so they may be enjoyed by
present and future generations of humans1 O Motorized travel destroys
the serenity sought by wilderness explorers traveling by primitive
means. The Gotchnik court interpreted Congress's intent in passing the
BWCAW Act as prohibiting even one motor violation within the
wilderness. Because Congress specifically exercised its discretion in
designating "partial" wilderness status for portions of the BWCAW
where it allowed motorized travel, the justification is even stronger that
Congress intended to strictly regulate all users of the remaining "full"
wilderness. Congress's strongly stated intent and its definition of
"wilderness" provide firm guidance for judicial interpretation. It is
possible that a conservation area that did not enjoy such clearly defined
not provide as predictable an outcome when challenged in
goals 1would
31
court.

C. Are the BWCA W Motor Restrictions Non-Discriminatory?
The regulations against motorized travel apply to both Indians and
non-Indians and have been enforced against the general public since
128. Id.
129. See United States v. Dion, 752 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1985); see also supra Part III.

130. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1994).
131. A variety of geographically designated conservation areas exist within the National
Forest System. For example, National Recreation Areas are established by Congress and
emphasize the outstanding recreational resources of a particular geographic area. See, e.g., 16
U.S.C. § 460 p-3 (1994) (directing the Secretary of Agriculture to institute accelerated
development of outdoor recreation facilities devised to take advantage of the Spruce KnobSeneca Rocks National Recreation Area). The limits placed on uses within National
Recreation Areas are much less specific than those placed on wilderness. National Wild and
Scenic Rivers, also designated by Congress, have a clearly stated purpose but Congress grants
the administering agency much discretion in determining what uses are allowed within a Wild
and Scenic River corridor. 16 U.S.C. § 1281 (1994). Research Natural Areas are small
geographical areas designated because they contain remarkable ecological characteristics.
See 36 C.F.R. § 251.23 (2000). They are designated administratively and although the reasons
for their designation are clear, the restrictions on use within Research Natural Areas are not
clear.
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1978.132 No challenge has been made to this conclusion. However, when
applying the equal protection standard to a federal regulation, the
guarantee will stem from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.'
VIII. CONCLUSION
Are the Puyallup standards appropriate for federal courts to use
when evaluating federal conservation regulations? Apparently some
commentators believe they are not. One commentator has stated that
"[e]xtending the Puyallup rationale from state regulatory jurisdiction to
federal statutes would provide an alternative, judicial method of treaty
abrogation at the federal level. l' ' "Back-door" abrogation could occur
when, by superimposing a "valid regulation" over a treaty right, the
right becomes effectively eliminated. "5
Another commentator has stated that if the United States acted
under its broad Property Clause authority, it would be unrestricted by
the judicial limits in place for state conservation regulations." Such
plenary power, however, would not go unchallenged. It would only be a
matter of time before judicial standards developed to evaluate the
validity of federal conservation regulations.
The Puyallup standards are well defined and clear in their intent.
They set a high standard for permissible conservation regulation of
treaty rights. They have been consistently upheld by the Supreme
Court.
However, two additional aspects must be considered when applying
the Puyallup standards to federal conservation regulations. The first is
the need to ensure that the regulation stems from a valid congressional
authority. The second is the need to balance any conservation
regulations with the United States' trust responsibility to the Indians.

132. See United States v. Gotchnik, 57 F. Supp. 2d 798, 804 (D. Minn. 1999), affd, 222
F.3d 506 (8th Cir. 2000).
133. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (interpreting the Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution).
134. Sally J. Johnson, Honoring Treaty Rights and Conserving EndangeredSpecies After
United States v. Dion, 13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 179, 190 (1992).
135. See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Michigan Dep't
of Nat'l Res., 141 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1998) (striking down a municipal regulation that banned
commercial fishing boats from transient mooring at public marinas because it would "simply
destroy all rights to commercially fish that were conveyed [to the tribes]").
136. H. Barry Holt, Property Clause Regulation Off Federal Lands: An Analysis, and
PossibleApplication to Indian Treaty Rights, 19 ENVTL. L. 295, 320 (1988).
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The clarity of a federal conservation regulation may be diminished
because the federal government serves as an advocate for Indian tribes,
whose interests must be protected. This need for balance was not
addressed in the Eighth Circuit cases discussed.
Courts in the Eighth Circuit have provided a series of opinions that
preserve the Supreme Court's intent in allowing the regulation of treaty
rights under well defined standards. The cases provide crucial guidance
for federal courts evaluating increasingly challenged federal regulations.
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